Fairness of Extra-Gain Guilty in Performance of Supply Chain and Contract Design

作     者：LI Jianbin FAN Xiaoshuai DAI Bin 

作者机构：School of Management Huazhong University of Science and Technology Economics and Management School Wuhan University 

基　　金：partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.71571079,71301122,71671133,71131004 Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University under Grant No.NCET-13-0228 

出 版 物：《Journal of Systems Science & Complexity》 (系统科学与复杂性学报（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2017年第30卷第4期

页      码：866-882页

摘      要：Considering a one-supplier and two-retailer supply chain setting in which the supplier makes contacts with retailers in sequence based on FCFS(first–come–first-service) principle, the authors investigate the marginal effect of extra-gain guilty fairness concerns of supply chain members on the contract design, supply chain s profit and profit distribution. When the supplier considers distributional fairness of loss aversion and extra-gain guilty, extra-gain guilty concern reduces the optimal wholesale and retail price, and improves supply chain performance. When the first or the second retailer considers distributional fairness and peer-induced fairness, extra-gain guilty concerns decrease the optimal wholesale and retail price but increase the profit of all supply chain members only when the level of loss aversion is large enough and the level of extra-gain guilty is less than 1/2. However, when the level of loss aversion is small and the level of extra-gain guilty is less than 1/2, extra-gain guilty has no influence on supply chain performance. The analysis reveals that the supply chain performance can be further improved by considering fairness of extra-gain guilty.

主 题 词：供应链 公平性 绩效 设计 利润分配 零售价格 先来先服务 供应商 

学科分类：12[管理学] 120202[120202] 1202[管理学-工商管理类] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程类] 0701[理学-数学类] 

核心收录：

D　O　I：10.1007/s11424-017-5133-9

馆 藏 号：203261258...