摘要：An appropriate advertising mode selection and allocation of advertising budgets considering advertising budget constraints are developed with the game theory and optimization *** results show that the advertising budget and the weakening factor of the online advertising effects on the traditional advertising affect sellers advertising,pricing strategies and budget *** effectiveness of combination advertising is a Pareto optimum relative to the traditional advertising in a certain *** weakening effect of the online advertising on the traditional advertising has a nonlinear effect on the advertising strategy and pricing *** addition,sellers choose combination advertising with different budget constraints,and there is an optimal budget allocation *** certain cases,sellers can obtain an optimal advertising expenditure less than the budget *** sellers adopt combination advertising with enough budget,they do not invest in traditional advertising without ***,compared with enough budget,when sellers adopt combination advertising with budget constrain,sellers do not decrease the advertising allocation of online advertising since online advertising is more efficient.

摘要：“Thumb up advertising”is a new and effective way to spread shared advertising in social *** the retailer adapts“thumb up advertising”in marketing with a game theory model is *** results show that when the retailer chooses to thumb up the advertising in Moments,a higher reward will increase the equilibrium price but hurt the retailer s expected profit;if the consumers can more easily reach the thumb up amount,the retailer will charge a higher price,and possibly gain more *** the retailer chooses thumb up at the end of the advertising context,a higher reward will increase the equilibrium price and the retailers expected profit will increase/*** the consumers are easier to reach the thumb up amount,the retailer will charge a higher price,and may get more *** a consumer s click cost of clicking the sharing advertising is higher,the retailer charges a lower price;and if the consumer s additional perceived value from the advertising is higher,the retailer charges a higher price and reaps more profit.

摘要：基于多边市场和博弈论理论,针对内容平台建立了免费、收费和现金补贴3种定价策略模型,并通过对各定价策略下的参数进行比较,确定平台最优定价策略.结果表明:广告干扰成本和广告边际收益影响平台定价策略的选择和现金补贴额度的设置,当两者处于特定阈值范围内时采用现金补贴策略,当广告干扰成本非常高时采用收费策略,其他情况下采用免费策略;现金补贴策略下,现金补贴额度与广告干扰成本负相关,与广告边际收益正相关;相同条件下,采用现金补贴策略比其他2种定价策略对各方利益主体和社会福利更好;现金补贴策略和免费策略下的一些参数受广告边际收益的影响趋势相反.

摘要：为厘清公共产品技术创新中双重依赖下分包商横向公平偏好对公共部门契约设计和期望收益的影响,构建基于公平偏好的单委托人–双代理人的模型.求解发现,随机依赖和分包商公平偏好对间接激励系数具有相反的影响,孰强孰弱影响了最优合同类型;而调整后的奖励分配更偏袒公平偏好较强的一方,导致其获得团队绩效合同的优势逐渐明显;公共部门针对分包商公平偏好进行的激励调整可以使自己获益,但不能忽视分包商的相对贡献,否则激励效果适得其反.因此,公共部门若想从激励强度调整中获益必须协调好双方的公平偏好与贡献大小.

摘要：To evaluate the effects of consumers＇ value attributes on a firm＇s marketing strategies with targeted advertising, each consumer＇s value is measured according to the consumer＇s consuming behavior and consumption features. The baseline model in which a firm sends targeted advertising to myopic consumers with constant valuations is established. The results showthat, when a firm sells products to consumers with distinct values using the strategies of targeted advertising and discriminative price, the firm＇s equilibrium profit with targeted advertising may not always be higher than that using mass advertising, which depends on the ratio of high-value and low-value consumers. Then, three extension models are ***, the firm sends targeted advertising to consumers with different targeting precisions. Secondly, the firm invests in the targeting precision of targeted advertising. Finally, the deliberation cost of rational consumers accepting the discriminative price and targeted advertising is considered. The results indicate that it is profitable for a firm to send targeted advertising to consumers with different value attributes.

摘要：A two-period duopoly model is developed to examine the competitive effects of targeted advertising with customer recognition （TACR）. In the model, two competing firms sell goods to end consumers in the first period, during which customer recognition is obtained. In the second period, advertising can be targeted toward different consumer types. Advertising is assumed to be persuasive in the way that consumer valuation is increased. equilibrium decisions and profits in each period are derived, showing that the firm who loses the current competition will win in the future. As a result, forward-looking firms price less aggressively so that their long-term profits can be enhanced with the help of TACR. Particularly, TACR improves profits through three important effects： valuation increasing, customer poaching, and anti-competition. Finally, this paper investigates the welfare issues, showing that firms enhance profits at the expense of consumer surplus. It is, therefore, suggested that public sectors take a step to protect consumers with the rapid development of targeting technology.

摘要：为了研究不同渠道对企业定向广告投放策略的影响问题,采用Stackelberg动态博弈建立了混合渠道模式下企业投放定向广告对产品的均衡价格、企业利润影响的决策模型。首先分析了单一渠道下企业投放定向广告的均衡策略,然后对混合渠道下企业分散化策略进行了研究,最后系统分析了混合渠道集中化动态化策略。结果表明:一方面,当企业通过混合渠道向目标消费者投放定向广告时,制造商能够利用定向广告更有效地细分目标市场,准确识别对价格敏感的消费者并形成局部垄断市场;另一方面,传统零售商的市场份额下降,零售商和制造商的渠道冲突进一步加剧。制造商制定合理有效的定向广告强度策略可以在一定程度上缓解渠道冲突。

摘要：通过建立博弈模型,研究了4种不同成本分担模式下供应商和零售商的均衡策略和均衡收益,分析了消费者信息投入对各均衡结果的影响,并对比了4种情形下的均衡策略和均衡收益,讨论了不同成本分担模式对供应商和零售商的影响.结果发现,消费者信息投入的有效性取决于广告和产品价格对市场需求的相对影响.当广告对市场需求的影响小于价格带来的影响时,消费者信息投入会导致供应商和零售商收益降低.当制造商和零售商共同承担消费者信息投入时,制造商会通过提高批发价格将消费者信息投入成本转移给零售商.相较于非合作广告,当制造商和零售商进行广告合作时,2个企业都会提高定价;考虑消费者信息投入时,供应商更倾向于进行广告合作,而零售商则偏好非合作广告.

摘要：基于双边市场理论模型和博弈分析方法,分析了垄断、竞争2种环境下广告定向契合度和消费者隐私信息保护对媒体平台价格策略、均衡利润和广告商广告策略的影响,以期为媒体平台和广告运营商做出正确的管理决策提供理论参考.研究结果表明,垄断环境下,媒体平台的均衡广告价格不依赖于广告定向契合度和消费者隐私信息保护程度.竞争环境下,当广告商单归属时,随着自身广告定向契合度和竞争对手广告定向契合度的增强,媒体平台的均衡广告价格和均衡利润将降低,消费者隐私信息保护程度对媒体平台均衡广告量的影响取决于媒体平台自身广告定向契合度与竞争对手广告定向契合度的对比;当广告商多归属时,媒体平台的均衡广告价格、均衡广告量、均衡利润与自身广告定向契合度呈正相关关系,与竞争对手的广告定向契合度呈负相关关系.媒体平台在参与市场竞争过程中,应综合考虑其广告定向契合度等因素,在其成长的不同时期,审慎制定价格策略.

摘要：为了研究在线广告和消费者参与对利润的影响,提出了一个指数形式的公式来描述社交媒体平台在两阶段供应链模型中的实际用户需求.根据广告成本承担主体的不同,提出了3种销售模式:制造商承担广告成本、零售商承担广告成本以及制造商和零售商分摊广告成本.对应3种销售模式构造了3种不同的数学模型进行分析.均衡分析结果表明,提高消费者黏性可以帮助玩家获得更多利润.正常的网络商家在任何情况下都不愿意承担成本.当社区扩散较低时,社交媒体平台愿意承担一定比例的广告成本,以吸引更多的用户参与.另外,社区扩散对制造商的利润具有更显著的提升作用.在社交媒体的背景下,供应链中的参与者应该将重点放在利用广告来改善社区扩散能力,而不是争论成本分担比例.