摘要：Aqueous zinc-ion batteries(AZIBs)show great potential for applications in grid-scale energy storage,given their intrinsic safety,cost effectiveness,environmental friendliness,and impressive electrochemical ***,strong electrostatic interactions exist between zinc ions and host materials,and they hinder the development of advanced cathode materials for efficient,rapid,and stable Zn-ion *** and their derivatives possess a large interlayer spacing,excellent hydrophilicity,outstanding electronic conductivity,and high redox *** materials are considered“rising star”cathode candidates for *** comprehensive review discusses recent advances in MXenes as AZIB cathodes from the perspectives of crystal structure,Zn-storage mechanism,surface modification,interlayer engineering,and conductive network design to elucidate the correlations among their composition,structure,and electrochemical *** work also outlines the remaining challenges faced by MXenes for aqueous Zn-ion storage,such as the urgent need for improved toxic preparation methods,exploration of potential novel MXene cathodes,and suppression of layered MXene restacking upon cycling,and introduces the prospects of MXene-based cathode materials for high-performance AZIBs.

摘要：Considering a one-supplier and two-retailer supply chain setting in which the supplier makes contacts with retailers in sequence based on FCFS(first–come–first-service) principle, the authors investigate the marginal effect of extra-gain guilty fairness concerns of supply chain members on the contract design, supply chain's profit and profit distribution. When the supplier considers distributional fairness of loss aversion and extra-gain guilty, extra-gain guilty concern reduces the optimal wholesale and retail price, and improves supply chain performance. When the first or the second retailer considers distributional fairness and peer-induced fairness, extra-gain guilty concerns decrease the optimal wholesale and retail price but increase the profit of all supply chain members only when the level of loss aversion is large enough and the level of extra-gain guilty is less than 1/2. However, when the level of loss aversion is small and the level of extra-gain guilty is less than 1/2, extra-gain guilty has no influence on supply chain performance. The analysis reveals that the supply chain performance can be further improved by considering fairness of extra-gain guilty.

摘要：The availability equivalence of different designs for a repairable multi-state series-parallel system(RMSPS) is discussed in this *** system components are assumed to be independent,and their failure and repair rates to be *** system availability is defined as the ability of the system to satisfy consumer *** improvement method and standby redundancy method are used to improve the system *** evaluate availability of the both original and improved systems,a fast technique,based on universal generating function,is *** availability equivalence factor is introduced to compare different system *** types of availability equivalence factors of the system are derived.A numerical example is provided to illustrate how to utilize the obtained results.

摘要：Many dynamic optimal control models for advertising make efforts to solve the problem of determining optimal advertising expenditures and other variables of interest over time for a firm or several competing firms,However,after analyzing the extant literature,one can find that few dynamic optimal advertising models available consider the problem within the product diffusion ***,the established models involving product diffusion are inspired by the Bass model,which has been out of *** paper poses a dynamic optimal advertising model for new products,which considers the product diffusion based on the relative newly developed generalized version of the Bass *** this paper,the optimal control model is used to derive the optimal advertising expenditure policy,which gives some implications to advertising practice.

摘要：Design-manufacturing chain （D-MC） is the most important link of the supply chain with the greatest possibility in cost reduction. How to strengthen the effective management of interracial relationship between designer and manufacturer and increase the efficency of interface management concerns the efficiency of the whole supply chain. In order to evaluate and improve the impacts of D-MC interfacial relationship, first we should construct the evaluation index system and then we should analyze the total cost and benefit of the interfacial relationship betterment, including the cost of member units in D-MC, the opportunity cost of cooperation partners, and the market returns resulted from the interfacial relationship improvement, which will advance the whole supply chain efficiency as well as enhance the management performance of D-MC.

摘要：An appropriate advertising mode selection and allocation of advertising budgets considering advertising budget constraints are developed with the game theory and optimization *** results show that the advertising budget and the weakening factor of the online advertising effects on the traditional advertising affect sellers advertising,pricing strategies and budget *** effectiveness of combination advertising is a Pareto optimum relative to the traditional advertising in a certain *** weakening effect of the online advertising on the traditional advertising has a nonlinear effect on the advertising strategy and pricing *** addition,sellers choose combination advertising with different budget constraints,and there is an optimal budget allocation *** certain cases,sellers can obtain an optimal advertising expenditure less than the budget *** sellers adopt combination advertising with enough budget,they do not invest in traditional advertising without ***,compared with enough budget,when sellers adopt combination advertising with budget constrain,sellers do not decrease the advertising allocation of online advertising since online advertising is more efficient.

摘要：“Thumb up advertising”is a new and effective way to spread shared advertising in social *** the retailer adapts“thumb up advertising”in marketing with a game theory model is *** results show that when the retailer chooses to thumb up the advertising in Moments,a higher reward will increase the equilibrium price but hurt the retailer s expected profit;if the consumers can more easily reach the thumb up amount,the retailer will charge a higher price,and possibly gain more *** the retailer chooses thumb up at the end of the advertising context,a higher reward will increase the equilibrium price and the retailers expected profit will increase/*** the consumers are easier to reach the thumb up amount,the retailer will charge a higher price,and may get more *** a consumer s click cost of clicking the sharing advertising is higher,the retailer charges a lower price;and if the consumer s additional perceived value from the advertising is higher,the retailer charges a higher price and reaps more profit.

摘要：After building a dynamic evolutionary game model, the essay studies the stability of the equilibrium in the game between the commercial banks and the closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) enterprises. By design of systematic mechanism based on system dynamics theory, capital chains of independent small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) on CLSC are organically linked together. Moreover, a comparative simulation is studied for the previous independent and post-design dependent systems. The study shows that with business expanding and market risk growing, the independent finance chains of SMEs on CLSC often take on a certain vulnerability, while the SMEs closed-loop supply chain finance system itself is with a strong rigidity and concerto.

摘要：As firms come under greater market pressure, the management of the inter-functional design/manufacture relationship becomes a more important competitive variable. The characteristics of the design-manufacture interface were analyzed, and several methods of the design-manufacture interface relationship management were compared. Based on theories concerned and enterprise practice, how to manage the relationship of design-manufacture interface to reduce the product cost and shorten the time-to-market was demonstrated, finally the competitive advantage was improved.

摘要：A necessary way to mitigate global warming is carbon reduction, which the international community is now actively promoting. China has committed a target goal for carbon reduction to the international society, and has devoted a great effort toward researching the impact of related policies. Carbon taxation and carbon trading are the two main mechanisms to advocate carbon abatement, which many countries have been using. Each of these two mechanisms possesses advantages and disadvantages, and an appropriate combination of them can make best use of their advantages while bypassing their disadvantages, creating a superior mechanism. In our opinion, the main differences between these two mechanisms are that carbon taxation has a lower institution cost(consisting of the related infrastructural investment and the regulation cost,etc), and is easier to operate, but lacks the flexibility in response to variations of market conditions. However, this flexibility is just the origin of risk, which increases the difficulty for firms in their decision of carbon abatement and is an indirect way to incentivize carbon abatement, compared to carbon trading, which has a more direct effect in carbon reduction. Based on the above observation, we present a hybrid mechanism of carbon abatement, which is an organized combination of carbon taxation and carbon trading. It consists of two parts: first, the carbon taxation, which has a progressive tax rate, second, the carbon trading. Small firms will only pay the carbon tax, while large firms, will first need to get the initial carbon emission quotas by some way, and then trade it in the carbon market if necessary. For firms with extra emissions,they will receive a punishment according to a high carbon tax rate. This hybrid policy considers the equity between different firms in carbon emission rights as well as the efficiency of the mechanism while decreasing the risk level for firms in the carbon emission decision, making it superior to the t